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 Abstract 
The excitement and promise generated by Urban Air Mobility (UAM) concepts have inspired both new 
entrants and large aerospace companies throughout the world to invest hundreds of millions in research and 
development of air vehicles, both piloted and unpiloted, to fulfill these dreams. The management and 
separation of all these new aircraft have received much less attention, however, and even though NASA’s 
lead is advancing some promising concepts for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Traffic Management 
(UTM), most operations today are limited to line of sight with the vehicle, airspace reservation and 
geofencing of individual flights. Various schemes have been proposed to control this new traffic, some 
modeled after conventional air traffic control and some proposing fully automatic management, either from 
a ground-based entity or carried out on board among the vehicles themselves. Previous work has examined 
vehicle-based traffic management in the very low altitude airspace within a metroplex called UTM airspace 
in which piloted traffic is rare. A management scheme was proposed in that work that takes advantage of 
the homogeneous nature of the traffic operating in UTM airspace. This paper expands that concept to 
include a traffic management plan usable at all altitudes desired for electric Vertical Takeoff and Landing 
urban and short-distance, inter-city transportation. The interactions with piloted aircraft operating under 
both visual and instrument flight rules are analyzed, and the role of Air Traffic Control services in the 
postulated mixed traffic environment is covered. Separation values that adapt to each type of traffic 
encounter are proposed, and the relationship between required airborne surveillance range and closure 
speed is given. Finally, realistic scenarios are presented illustrating how this concept can reliably handle 
the density and traffic mix that fully implemented and successful UAM operations would entail. 
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1. Introduction 
The development of electric and hybrid turbo/electric Vertical Takeoff and Landing (eVTOL) vehicles 
by both large and small aerospace companies for Urban Air Mobility (UAM) and short inter-city air taxi 
transportation is proceeding at a feverish pace. New battery technology, that has also created a resurgence 
of electric cars, is being adapted to drones for operators hoping to perform real transportation missions for 
packages and even people in metropolitan areas that frequently experience surface gridlock, resulting in 
long door-to-door transit times. Work on the vehicle side of this vision has progressed rapidly, with 
experimental first flights carrying people in Airbus’ Vahana, Kitty Hawk Cora, Volocopter 2X, and 
Workhorse Surefly [1][2]. Drones capable of surveillance missions and carrying small packages have also 
performed proof-of-concept flights. On August 2, 2019, the first drone flight approved by the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) for Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) operations took place as a 
pipeline inspection outside of Fairbanks, Alaska. Larger eVTOL and hybrid turbo/electric powered vehicles 
capable of carrying from one to six or more people are being designed and some have been test-flown in a 
piloted mode, but the new air taxis still face hurdles of regulation, public acceptance and economic viability 
before a major implementation will be seen. Helicopters, after all, perform these services all over the world 
today, but helicopter services perform a very small part of urban transportation and are expanding very 
slowly because of their high cost and noise (i.e., public acceptance) considerations. 
Traffic management of the new drones has been developing along a separate track. NASA has been 
instrumental in providing both a forum for government/industry cooperative development and by 
sponsoring local trials of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM) procedures. 
UTM is defined by increasingly complex Technical Capability Levels (TCL) permitting drone operators to 
reserve airspace for their missions in controlled airspace using third party applications on their smartphones. 
These third party UAS Service Suppliers (USS) have received FAA approval to use their software to ensure 
deconfliction of various drone operations in proximate airspace, thus avoiding the former, lengthy approval 
process that involved direct application to the FAA for each flight. UTM is not designed to handle large 
numbers of vehicles. In the recent TCL-4 trials in Reno, NV, five live vehicles and fifteen simulated drones 
were considered high density. 
UTM is also only applicable in the airspace 400 feet Above Ground Level (AGL) and below where 
small (less than 55 pound) drones operating under Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) Part 107 rules are 
used for photography, future small package delivery and hobby use. UAM calls for heavier vehicles 
carrying one or more human occupants flying at higher altitudes and among much greater numbers of 
vehicles than are using UTM procedures today. As their numbers grow, it will be increasingly impractical 
to separate these operations using airspace reservation procedures while still meeting the demand, and there 
will therefore be an incentive for the vehicles to separate themselves, freeing up significant volumes of 
airspace they plan to use on their missions. 
 Separation of UAM vehicles is commonly compared to the existing Air Traffic Control (ATC) system, 
in place for piloted flights, but that paradigm is fraught with difficulties when applied to UAM. Surveillance 
and communication are hampered by a myriad of obstacles blocking transmissions, creating multi-path 
errors and hazards to navigation itself. The projected number of users needing separation service is expected 
to be well beyond the capacities of Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) and 
conventional radar beacon surveillance. The use of flight plans and pre-authorizations for flight is not 
compatible with the unfettered use of millions of vehicles. The Adaptive Airborne Separation concept 
proposed in this paper applies principles of Airborne Trajectory Management (ABTM) and Autonomous 
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Flight Rules (AFR) [3][4][5] to ensure safety in flight and for persons and property on the ground. The 
concept is designed to accommodate realities of the UAM vision that, in the long term, make it unsuited 
for either the UTM paradigm or an extension of the existing ATC-based Air Traffic Management (ATM) 
system. 
For UAM to be a major component of urban mobility and to be both economically viable and 
operationally practical, autonomy must be pursued now for all aspects of drone and air taxi flights. Adaptive 
Airborne Separation addresses the traffic management aspect of autonomy within a framework of approved 
rules and procedures. 
2. Background 
The vehicles being designed by Boeing, Airbus and Bell have, in addition to their vertical takeoff and 
landing capability, the ability to transition to a higher speed, forward flight mode using lifting wings for 
greater efficiency. Operators of these vehicles and the air taxis propose to use altitudes that place them in 
airspace that directly interacts with all other flight operations, including airline, General Aviation and 
military, using both Visual Flight Rules (VFR) and Instrument Flight Rules (IFR). By contrast, small 
package delivery services using drones flying in and under the Class B metropolitan airspace below 500 
feet AGL enjoy a uniquely protected airspace nearly devoid of all other conventional traffic.  
Virtually all the passenger-carrying eVTOL manufacturers plan to begin operations with a human pilot 
on board, even though the vehicles are being designed for eventual autonomous flight. These human pilots 
can see and avoid other VFR traffic and interact with ATC the same as piloted helicopter flights today. 
However, adding these aircraft to the mix in Class B and C airspace could easily overwhelm the ability of 
ATC to manage them. If these flights are to make an impact on transportation as a whole, there must be a 
great many of them, probably two orders of magnitude greater than the number of conventional aircraft 
flying today. If the number of drones in the Dallas/Fort Worth metroplex were just one percent of the 
number of cars, there would be 50,000 of them. Putting this many aircraft into the existing ATC system 
would overwhelm it, making it unmanageable. If growth of eVTOL transportation was attempted by making 
use of existing ATC services, delays would mount as the traffic grew to the point where the service would 
first suffer, then become untenable as an alternative to surface transport. Additionally, as long as they are 
piloted, the numbers of these flights will be small for the same reason that the number of helicopter flights 
is small: direct operating cost. The cost to pay a pilot and the fact that the pilot accounts for one-half to one-
sixth of the payload prohibits profitable mass transportation using this model. 
For that reason, an evolution to an alternative form of traffic management was proposed in papers on 
ABTM [4] and AFR [5]. ABTM is an evolutionary, stepwise concept for automating aircraft trajectory 
optimization in the presence of hazardous weather, all other traffic and restrictions in the airspace. 
Originally designed for use in airline aircraft, the first step in the ABTM Roadmap, known as Traffic Aware 
Strategic Aircrew Requests (TASAR), has already been tested in operational use on one airline and is being 
pursued for adoption by multiple airlines [6]. Succeeding steps in the ABTM Roadmap introduce data 
communications to the request/reclearance, adding the speed and time dimension and integration with 
traffic flow management (TFM) to the optimization logic, automatic approvals of the trajectory change 
requests and finally, full airborne separation in mixed traffic rules airspace. 
That final step in the ABTM Roadmap is enabled by AFR. When operating under AFR, air-to-air 
surveillance supports the use of approved separation logic in the aircraft that provides flight guidance to 
either a human pilot or autopilot to ensure safe and legal separation. Current intent information is 
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continuously provided to ATC for situational awareness. AFR flights give right of way to both IFR and 
VFR piloted flights, and thus ATC is not adversely impacted with new responsibilities for the safety of any 
AFR or IFR flight [7].  
As described in [3], traffic management of the operations in UTM airspace could be conducted locally 
using AFR, within the vehicles themselves, by adapting existing technologies and implementing 
appropriate rules and procedures tailored for their operations. That concept appears in summary in section 
4 of this paper. The use of AFR also enables non-interfering UAM flights in the ATM airspace above 500 
feet AGL. Sharing the broader airspace above 500 feet with piloted vehicles and centrally managed traffic 
control services presents a new set of challenges to overcome. For instance, there are multiple classes of 
both piloted and unpiloted vehicles, and there is the simultaneous use of three sets of flight rules. Traffic 
encounters may occur between any combination of vehicle and flight rule types and all must be 
appropriately handled. Those operational interactions are the central focus of Adaptive Airborne 
Separation, explained in section 5, and notional separation criteria for each type of traffic encounter are 
presented. 
This paper expands upon the UAM concept to address the issues brought forth by high volumes of 
autonomous aircraft in mixed traffic airspace (ATM airspace) and shows how the ABTM and AFR 
paradigms could enable the realization of safe, high density autonomous operations alongside 
conventionally piloted and centrally controlled flights. 
3. UAS Autonomy in the National Airspace System 
“Autonomy” has many connotations depending on the context and the scope of its application. When 
applied to flight, it is frequently equated with automation or automatic flight, as performed by an autopilot 
or autoflight system. Autopilots are capable of controlling aircraft in all phases of flight and may be 
programed in varying degrees to stabilize the aircraft’s attitude, maneuver and navigate from one place to 
another and even land and stop on a designated spot. Except for the autoland mode, however, autopilots in 
airplanes are not certified to be fail safe, but instead, rely on a human pilot to take over and continue the 
flight safely in the event of failure or encountering unforeseen events. These aircraft are thus not 
“autonomous” in their ability to independently control and navigate the aircraft under all circumstances.  
In the UAS world today, even though a pilot is not in the vehicle, a remote pilot controls its flight and 
its mission. In previous work [8], the extent of the remote pilot’s involvement was described as “Pilot in 
the Loop” (PITL), “Pilot on the Loop” (POTL), and “Pilot Operator as Manager” (POM).  PITL means the 
pilot is actively controlling the thrust and aerodynamic surfaces of the vehicle to maintain its attitude and 
flight path, such as flying a traditional radio-controlled model airplane. In POTL, a pilot controls an 
autopilot in the vehicle much as a pilot in a modern commercial transport using the autoflight Mode Control 
Panel and Flight Management System today. In POTL with remote pilots, the degree of involvement is the 
same in programming and executing the flight trajectory through the autoflight system. The remote pilot is 
engaged and can take over in the event of failure either through direct use of the flight controls or by 
executing other means for safe termination of the flight. True autonomous flight control emerges in POM 
in which there is a flight operations manager, probably not a licensed pilot, who initiates flight operations 
(even many flights simultaneously) that are programmed to accomplish the entire mission. The manager 
may subsequently alter or terminate a mission early but does not control the autoflight system in the manner 
of today’s piloted aircraft. Also, he is not capable of taking control of the aircraft in the event of onboard 
failures. These must be handled “autonomously” by the vehicle using internal sensors, logic and safety 
systems.  Thus operational autonomy is the conduct of flight operations by POM. 
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Building upon the experience of 100 years of radio control hobbyists, the FAA recently created an initial 
set of rules for flying small drones that are contained in FAR Part 107. The majority of civil UAS flights 
today use remote pilots (i.e., POTL) for their control and employ vehicles weighing less than 55 pounds 
that are thus subject to the rules of FAR Part 107. These rules require the operator, or a visual observer, to 
keep the drone being controlled in sight and avoid presenting a collision hazard to other aircraft or 
endangering the life or property of another. Other specific limitations include no flight at night, over people, 
more than 400 feet above the ground or within five miles of an airport without ATC approval. Waivers to 
these limitations may be requested, reviewed, and approved by the FAA on an individual basis. Of these 
limitations, the most onerous is the prohibition of flight near airports, since that is where most people live 
and would like to fly. Because of this, the FAA has established automated approval procedures called Low 
Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability (LAANC). A drone operator can use an app on a 
smartphone to request approval to operate within five miles of an airport through one of fourteen third party 
USS and receive approval within seconds if the requested airspace is available. These POTL flights are 
auto stabilized and navigated using the Global Positioning System (GPS) to fly to specified locations and 
maintain commanded heights. 
Operations of larger unmanned vehicles beyond visual line of sight and in clouds may be approved with 
an exemption under section 333 of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 [9]. Part 107 rules are 
not applicable to these flights. IFR high altitude missions are flown by a remote pilot in a sophisticated 
Ground Control Station controlling the vehicle primarily in the POTL mode and interacting with ATC as 
though he were in the vehicle. These IFR flights generally climb to the positive controlled airspace above 
Flight Level (FL) 180 while within restricted airspace to avoid interaction with VFR flights not in contact 
with ATC. The number of these large UAS flights is small enough not to place undue burden on the ATC 
system. While these flights are generally controlled in the POTL mode, they may be flown in the PITL 
mode if desired or under certain failure conditions.  
Autonomous flights of UAS vehicles in which the operator plans and originates the flight but otherwise 
only monitors its progress (i.e., POM) will require the waivers for BVLOS and, depending on the mission, 
flights at night and over people. This mode of operation is ultimately sought by all manufacturers of 
eVTOLs for UAM as the economics of the operation will not accommodate the cost of pilots for every 
vehicle. Very active teaming activity by the FAA and manufacturers is underway today to create the 
necessary rules for certification of these vehicles that will provide the requisite safety. Current regulations 
for certifying airplanes and helicopters are inadequate for the lift and thrust configurations on the new 
vehicles and for some of their intended operations, including autonomous flight. The level of automation 
inherent in these vehicles goes well beyond current autopilots to include the entire flight spectrum from 
liftoff to touchdown, trajectory optimization, hazard avoidance, flight anomaly mitigation, separation from 
other aircraft, and participation in surface operations management. All of this must be provided with 
redundancy and other contingent measures for all known and anticipated system failures. This implies a 
fairly high level of artificial intelligence to recognize, troubleshoot and resolve vehicle system failures, 
adverse weather encounters and unforeseen traffic situations in flight and at the ground operations sites. 
While autonomous flight control of unpiloted vehicles has been experimentally demonstrated [8], it is 
not expected to be commonplace for several years. Autonomous flight in the air traffic system presents an 
entirely different set of issues, however. Even the most advanced Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs) flying 
IFR beyond line of sight at virtually any altitude still require the remote pilot to be in continuous contact 
with the ATC facility having jurisdiction over the airspace in which that flight is operating. Direct 
controller-to-UAV communications do not yet exist without the remote human pilot intermediary. It could 
be envisioned in the future world of ATC data communications that controller-to-vehicle automated 
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communication would be possible, but then the air traffic controller would become the de facto remote pilot 
with its attendant responsibilities and liability. The controller would also be limited by not knowing the 
mission other than the flight plan data, which the UAS manager might want to alter from time to time. Also, 
the controller would not have the efficiency motivation of the operator when determining and altering intent 
during flight. Therefore, while autonomous flight has been demonstrated experimentally and VFR offers a 
form of ATC autonomy in the National Airspace System (NAS), the two concepts must be merged in a 
fashion that supports the economical operations of eVTOLs while not burdening ATC. 
4. UAM/ATC Interoperability Through AFR  
In the AFR concept, airborne software monitors the traffic, weather and airspace restrictions to define a 
conflict-free and optimized trajectory from present position to the destination. How it can do this in a 
manner that does not interfere with other ATC operations is best explained through a short review of the 
broader system for centralized, ground-based air traffic control. ATC services, as they exist in the world 
today, are a complex mix of hardware, automation systems and procedures enabling human controllers to 
maintain safe separation among most of the aircraft in their defined sectors of airspace. The term most of 
the aircraft is used because in Class G and most Class E airspace, VFR flights are permitted to operate 
without participating in any air traffic services and often without the knowledge of ATC. The pilots of VFR 
flights are responsible for their own separation using “see and be seen” principles, standard right of way 
rules, and at non-towered airports, standard flight patterns and direct pilot-to-pilot communications on the 
Common Traffic Advisory Frequency. Landings have priority over takeoffs and the sequence is set by the 
closest (in time) to the launch and recovery spot. These VFR flights employ a form of autonomy that has 
existed during the entire century-plus history of powered flight. It is dependent, however, on pilots being 
present on the aircraft and vigilant for other nearby traffic. 
 In Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC), this form of separation cannot work because of the 
lack of visibility, and it is therefore not permitted. One exception to this statement is the military flight 
formation that is maintained visually by the pilots, often even in clouds, but ATC separates the entire 
formation as a single entity from other aircraft. In the world of high volume, dense UAS traffic, other 
systems must perform this separation function independent of ATC and do it more reliably than is possible 
using human vision. To address this issue, electronic surveillance systems and automated Conflict Detection 
and Resolution (CD&R) systems have been developed and rules employing these systems established to 
create a capability known as Detect and Avoid (DAA). Standards for DAA [11] were developed and 
separation values determined in RTCA Special Committee (SC) 228 to enable UAS to remain “well clear” 
of piloted VFR flights when operating BVLOS. This capability is considered a requirement for the 
commercial viability of UAM. 
 While this paper focuses on the separation of UAM vehicles from all flights, it is recognized that ATC 
provides both a separation function and a TFM function. The latter is used to prevent traffic density from 
becoming unmanageable by a human controller and to deliver a stream of aircraft to a runway at its current 
acceptance rate. “Automated Tower” software with a self-organizing feature can do these functions but it 
does not address enroute separation. Aircraft separation is a complex subject that has received a great deal 
of attention over the years. For example, separation was studied in depth for decades by the International 
Civil Aviation Organization’s “Review of the General Concept of Separation” Panel. The author was a 
founding member of that panel, representing the International Federation of Airline Pilot’s Associations. 
Rational determination of separation minima in environments both with and without surveillance was 
sought. The process was very heavy on data gathering, calculating mathematical and statistical risk 
probabilities and attempting to reach an agreement among stakeholders on an “acceptable level of risk”. 
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One example of the difficulty of changing historical separation criteria is the reduction from 2000 to 1000 
feet vertical separation above FL290. This reduction, Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum, took 32 years 
to accomplish from the first serious efforts until it was finally implemented, initially in the North Atlantic. 
UAM stakeholders expect a much faster procedural and regulatory accommodation. 
The separation function in any control paradigm is a four-step control process that can be described as 
1) Measurement, 2) Prediction, 3) Control and 4) Feedback. Separation is said to be “strategic” if it is based 
on flights navigating along extended non-intersecting paths or separated by time at fixed, charted merge or 
intersection points. Strategic separation generally does not include direct surveillance but depends upon 
position reporting from the controlled aircraft and on-board navigation to ensure separation from obstacles 
and other aircraft. Geofencing is a form of strategic separation. “Tactical” separation control presumes near-
real-time surveillance. Controllers use a display of aircraft in their sectors, fed by radar and ADS-B, to 
locate the aircraft and measure their dynamic interactions. When standard separation is predicted to be lost 
(determined either through mental projection or using conflict prediction software), control instructions are 
issued to one or more of the pilots to alter their flight trajectories in a manner that resolves the predicted 
conflict. Controllers then receive acknowledgement by radio and monitor the flight paths to ensure that the 
commanded action is taking place as planned.  
The separation process is performed this way by human controllers in air traffic control facilities 
throughout the world. However, it is possible to perform the same function automatically using surveillance 
and automated separation systems within the aircraft themselves. This vehicle-hosted, automated separation 
process is inherent to AFR operations, as described in detail in [5]. Self-separation under AFR relies on 
ADS-B In surveillance and CD&R algorithms embedded in flight guidance software. The CD&R 
algorithms would cover all combinations of vehicle encounters and be approved for use by the certifying 
authority. The flight guidance output can be displayed to a human pilot or fed directly to the UAV 
automated flight control system. In the automated case, the control loop times are much smaller and 
therefore enable much smaller minimum-separation values. The AFR concept for use in an airline 
environment was extensively tested in multiple fast time and human-in-the-loop (HITL) simulations [7]. A 
follow-on roadmap for facilitating the implementation of AFR was described in [4] presenting a series of 
five steps of increasing capability of ABTM, beginning with the TASAR application of in-flight conflict-
free trajectory optimization, currently being explored by multiple airlines for adoption. A follow-on series 
of Next Generation Air Transportation System and aircraft system improvements lead ultimately to AFR, 
at which time participating aircraft could optimize their flight trajectories while separating themselves from 
all other traffic in the airspace, both VFR and IFR. While this roadmap was developed to enable 
conventional vehicle operations to transition to AFR, alternate roadmaps may be more appropriate for 
introduction of AFR to new types of vehicles and operations such as UAM, since they are not already 
steeped in the current ATM system. 
Reference [3] applies the AFR concept for traffic self-separation to low altitude UAS flight operations, 
where it was shown how urban UAVs could separate themselves while flying within 400 feet of the surface 
where most piloted aircraft do not operate. Reference [3] also introduced a new concept for separating 
passenger-carrying unpiloted air taxis using a maximum angular velocity between passing vehicles to define 
a minimum lateral separation distance between the aircraft in conflict to prevent the appearance of a 
collision hazard. The symbol ωsep is used in this paper to indicate the use of angular velocity to derive the 
adaptive, minimum design separation value. 
Self-separation in the airspace above 400 feet involves interactions with piloted aircraft, and most UAM 
proposals have assumed the involvement of traditional ATC in these separation encounters as a result, 
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operating either as VFR or IFR. During an initial period in which these aircraft are piloted and their numbers 
are small, that model might work. The introduction of Data Communications (Data Comm) to the enroute 
airspace will help simplify the communication between remotely piloted UAVs and controllers. However, 
the overwhelming volume of traffic envisioned in UAM makes this assumption impractical as a sustainable 
and scalable solution and impossible once the numbers of eVTOLs begins to surpass traditional aircraft. 
Uber and others have already indicated they plan to operate above 400 feet AGL, so these flights will not 
be down in the UTM airspace with the package-carrying drones. For these higher-altitude, mixed 
operations, this paper proposes AFR as the safest and most expeditious means to integrate UAM vehicles 
in the airspace. 
Air traffic in the airspace at and above 500 feet AGL is already considered by ATC to be “congested” 
in the urban areas, and delays attributed to congestion are commonplace. Alternate control paradigms are 
needed to overcome the limitations of human centered ATC. Some such paradigms are being investigated, 
such as the government/industry consortium in Kansas that recently completed an FAA-approved, BVLOS 
flight using an Iris Automation, Casia manufactured, computer-visual DAA system [10]. AFR is another 
example of an alternate control paradigm to overcome the limitations of human-centered ATC. 
 Once it is accepted that separation among UAM aircraft must be automated, two choices emerge 
regarding separation of UAM aircraft from conventional piloted aircraft in mixed operations airspace: (1) 
the automated function could be centralized physically with the placement of authority and responsibility 
within a body such as the FAA (or a third party provider approved by the FAA to provide this function), or 
(2) the separation automation (following rules approved by the regulatory authority) could be hosted locally 
in the vehicles (i.e., distributed among the vehicles) and responsibility for separation is placed with the 
operators of each of the vehicles. This choice can be said to be between a global versus a local separation 
solution. The following arguments point out the disadvantages of the centralized solution and the 
advantages of the local, distributed solution. 
As stated above, any separation system requires some form of surveillance, communications, and 
control. Centralized surveillance relies on communication being maintained with all vehicles at all times 
from the central location. This can be extremely difficult in an urban environment due to the presence of 
many tall buildings reflecting and shielding electronic signals. It also requires either very many receiving 
sites or high-power transmissions from the communicating vehicles. Transmissions for surveillance are 
safety-of-life critical and cannot be placed in a queue to be delivered in turn. Even the cell networks are 
severely challenged by this requirement. 
 Distributing the surveillance and communication tasks to the vehicles themselves ensures that those 
aircraft in close enough proximity to each other to be in conflict will also have short-range, usually direct-
line-of-sight, communications available, even in low altitude, high density operations. The use of ADS-B 
In, or any active surveillance system, risks frequency saturation if the transmissions are at high enough 
power to be received at a remote centralized location [13]. The local, distributed solution permits the use 
of low power surveillance transmissions, thus preventing lost messages due to frequency saturation. 
An additional argument comes from the failure analysis. In a centralized control system, any single point 
of failure in the communications, surveillance or automation equipment performing the CD&R function 
will cause at least a local failure of separation service. Some of the possible failure modes would disrupt 
the service for all the drones in the whole service area. There are many examples of this having taken place 
within our current ATC system [14][15]. Conversely, placing the separation capability within the aircraft 
using redundant equipment guarantees that no single system failure will impact the entire operation. Even 
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in an individual conflict, either aircraft in the conflict pair can ensure a safe outcome in the presence of a 
failure on the other. Finally, individual responsibility for safety through adherence to aviation standards for 
AFR eliminates the need for major infrastructure development and acquisition by the government and 
greatly limits its liability, like VFR. This approach will speed the approval and implementation of eVTOL 
services in the National Airspace System. 
The foregoing arguments are particularly relevant to low altitude (400 feet AGL and below), very dense 
operations in UTM airspace. UAM flights in the ATM airspace at 500 feet AGL and above must meet the 
requirements for surveillance and communications of piloted aircraft but their great numbers could quickly 
overwhelm ATC services. The use of AFR by these aircraft is naturally scalable and prevents the increase 
in traffic from becoming unmanageable. 
5. Notional Design of Adaptive Airborne Separation in Mixed Operations  
The rest of this paper assumes the local/distributed separation approach (i.e., AFR) to mixed operations 
(i.e., autonomous eVTOL and piloted vehicles) in Class B, C, D, E, and G airspace. It is assumed that 
eVTOLs will not operate above FL 180 and thus not in the Class A airspace, though AFR was originally 
designed to be fully compatible with Class A operations. Separation encounters will be considered among 
five classes of vehicles, defined as follows: 
1. UAVcargo   is a cargo, small package or surveillance eVTOL vehicle with no humans aboard (i.e., 
UTM using AFR) 
2. UAVpax   is a passenger carrying autonomous eVTOL (i.e., UAM using AFR) 
3. PAVFR  is a piloted aircraft operating under VFR 
4. PAIFR  is a piloted aircraft operating under IFR 
5. PAAFR  is a piloted aircraft operating under AFR 
Each class of aircraft will be considered with respect to the separation values and flight rules applied 
with every other class of aircraft since all combinations of encounters may occur in the subject airspace. 
Both classes of UAV, whether carrying humans or not, are presumed to operate under AFR. Whether 
used by piloted flights or embedded in software controlling autonomous flights, the operating principles of 
the proposed AFR rules are the same. Using onboard surveillance, CD&R algorithms detect traffic conflicts 
and resolve them using approved and standardized rules for priority and applied separation distances. 
Because there are differences in the control loop times for piloted and autonomous flights (due to human 
reaction time), their design separation values are different. ATC is kept advised of the AFR flight’s intent 
for situational awareness but is not responsible for its safety in any way. Autonomous vehicles using AFR 
are thus known to ATC but are not subject to ATC for pre-approval of maneuvers. Rather than providing 
maneuvering flight guidance to the pilot to resolve traffic conflicts, the CD&R output of the onboard 
automation directly controls the flight path of the UAV. In order to prevent controllers from having to 
consider the AFR traffic, IFR traffic is given right of way in every AFR-IFR encounter. VFR traffic is 
avoided using the rules of AFR and the separation distances derived for DAA in RTCA SC 228.  
Both classes of UAVs are unpiloted and self-separate following AFR right-of-way rules. They also self-
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separate from every other class of aircraft giving those aircraft right-of-way in all situations. The design 
separation values do vary, however, adapting to the specific class of aircraft they encounter as shown in 
Table 1. This means no piloted aircraft or controller has to change rules or procedures when AFR operations 
are occurring in the airspace. UAVcargo  to UAVcargo encounters use the smallest design separation value 
possible since they will have the tightest control loop parameters for surveillance, separation computation 
and control. Notionally, the design separation could be as low as 50 feet both laterally and vertically [3]. 
UAVcargo  to UAVpax encounters risk startling and causing anxiety in the UAVpax  passengers if the encounter 
has both high closure speed and small design separation, so the ωsep variable separation is proposed to limit 
the angular velocity at passing to an acceptable value (e.g. 1 radian per second). The same is true for UAVpax  
to UAVpax encounters. Either UAV class to PAVFR follows the “remain well clear” practice among VFR 
aircraft. The DAA Phase 1 Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) translates that to a 35 
second τ (range divided by closure speed) or 4000 feet lateral and 450 feet vertical separation in these 
encounters [8]. A very rigorous mathematical and analytical process was conducted to establish this 
engineering equivalent to “well clear” separation in the MOPS [16]. 
Normally, the calculation of separation values is based on the performance of the surveillance and 
control systems (i.e., accuracy, latency, control response). But even if the surveillance and aircraft control 
were to have perfect performance, the controlling parameter for minimum separation distance becomes the 
perception of hazard by the passengers during aircraft passage. Table 1 presents notional values for all 
combinations of aircraft encounters that should be validated through HITL simulations and flight test. 
Table 1. Notional design separation values for encounters between different classes of aircraft. 
 
 
 UAVcargo UAVpax PAVFR PAIFR PAAFR 
UAVcargo L     50 feet 
V    50 feet 
S     50 feet 
ωsep 
250 feet 
250 feet 
4000 feet 
450 feet 
1/4 mile 
3 miles 
1000 feet 
2 miles 
ωsep 
500 feet 
½ mile 
UAVpax  L ωsep 
V 250 feet 
S 250 feet 
4000 feet 
450 feet 
¼ mile 
3 miles 
1000 feet 
2 miles 
ωsep 
500 feet 
½ mile 
PAVFR   L Well clear 
V 
S 
Well clear ωsep 
500 feet 
½ mile 
PAIFR    L 3 miles 
V 1000 feet 
S 2 miles 
3 miles 
1000 feet 
2 miles 
PAAFR     L ωsep 
V 500 feet 
S ½ mile 
Note: Wake separation criteria would increase these values when applicable. 
L = Design lateral separation 
V = Design vertical separation 
S = Design longitudinal or slow closure separation 
Blue indicates existing separation values 
Green indicates proposed notional separation values 
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 The principle of “least disruption” is a key component of applying the AFR concept to UAM air traffic 
management. In the context of separation from conventional piloted traffic, this means that the new eVTOL 
operations will provide the same separation values with piloted aircraft that are used in the piloted aircraft’s 
respective flight rules so that those rules do not have to be changed to accommodate AFR. Least disruption 
for the eVTOL operators favors unrestricted choice in selecting the flight trajectory in exchange for giving 
right-of-way to IFR flights in all encounters. This permits optimized flight directly between landing spots 
(“vertiports”) rather than the UTM design of segregated flyways or the use of dedicated UAM airspace. It 
also permits controllers to continue to manage their traffic in the Class B, C, D, and E airspace without 
changing their procedures or having any concern for the thousands of UAM flights taking place around 
them without interference, since they will all be operating under AFR which requires giving way to all IFR 
traffic. 
Integrating UAM flights into ATM will not require changing the regulatory 200 knot speed limit below 
2,500 feet AGL within 4 nautical miles (NM) of a Class C or D airport and beneath the Class B airspace. 
In all other airspace below 10,000 feet above Mean Sea Level (MSL), the 250-knot limit still applies. These 
speeds are important, not only for “see and avoid” from piloted aircraft, but also to help define the required 
airborne surveillance range for the eVTOLs, as will be shown below. The rules that require being in 
communication with ATC in Class C and D airspace and on an ATC clearance in Class B airspace would 
be covered by the AFR rules providing position and intent to ATC in these and all airspaces. Access by 
eVTOL to the primary airports in these classes of airspace would be non-interfering to and from vertiport 
areas located to the sides of the runways, as covered in [3]. 
Surveillance of other traffic by the eVTOLs can be easily satisfied in the Class B airspace because of 
the transponder and ADS-B equipment mandate as of January 1, 2020. ADS-B In and low power active 
Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) interrogations from the eVTOLs would provide 
redundant sources of active surveillance data for both separation and collision avoidance. In Class G and 
Class E airspace below 10,000 feet MSL, surveillance is complicated by the fact that cooperative 
surveillance equipment is not required. An active radar system, an electro-optical (EO) sensor, or both are 
needed to provide surveillance data to the UAVs to detect and avoid non-cooperating VFR traffic legally 
flying in this airspace. Since VFR requires three miles visibility in the Class E airspace below 10,000 feet 
and none of the non-cooperative targets are very fast, existing electronic vision systems should be sufficient 
for this purpose. In the Class G airspace, only one-mile visibility is required, so late detection using visual 
means alone might not support the separation values for VFR traffic in Table 1. Technically, transponders 
and ADS-B equipment are not required for IFR flight in Class G and E airspace either, outside the 30-mile 
veils, but as a practical matter, there are almost no aircraft in the United States (U.S.) that are certified for 
IFR and that do not carry this equipment. ATC could keep an IFR flight with a transponder or ADS-B 
failure separated from all other IFR and AFR traffic, because this is such a rare event. This means that 
onboard radar/EO equipment is not required for UAVs to separate themselves from IFR traffic. 
Communication equipment on autonomous eVTOL aircraft must serve three purposes: (1) provide 
mission-level status and control to the operator; (2) provide state and intent information to ATC; and (3) 
coordinate maneuvers with other aircraft during collision avoidance. The first of these communications 
may take many forms and is between the operator and the Federal Communications Commission to 
establish and approve. In the second, ADS-B provides velocity vector information, but not longer-term 
intent. Recent development of Data Comm within the FAA’s ATC automation systems use the term “Flight 
Object” to describe the information coming from an aircraft on its identification, state information, and 
intent. Providing intent from an autonomous UAV in the Flight Object to ATC should be accomplished 
using established Data Comm protocols once the FAA’s equipment is operational but may be done using 
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airborne System Wide Information Management (SWIM) in the interim. For the third, AFR applies 
“implicit coordination” (i.e., rules of priority and maneuver direction) that does not rely on communications 
between vehicles for the separation function, but AFR also includes a collision avoidance function that 
could use the TCAS crosslink communication standards [17]. 
As presented in [3], all separation performed to the design separation values listed in Table 1 use the 
principle of implicit coordination in the tactical separation algorithms, which uses state-based trajectory 
predictions versus explicit trajectory intent. These state-based trajectory predictions are also used in the 
tactical separation algorithms for AFR. They make it possible to resolve a separation conflict without two-
way communication between the aircraft in conflict. Using extensions of existing right-of-way rules and 
conflict detection accounting for trajectory prediction uncertainty, the aircraft burdened to resolve a conflict 
can do so with high confidence in the success of the outcome, namely, that design separation will be 
achieved by the closest point of approach.  
If the burdened aircraft does not maneuver, or the maneuver is predicted to be insufficient, the priority 
aircraft, if it is also operating under AFR, will maneuver to achieve the design separation (i.e. the principle 
of redundancy in a distributed system). If design separation is still not being achieved or if the conflict is 
with a VFR or IFR aircraft, a loss of design separation will activate the collision avoidance logic in the 
AFR aircraft and any TCAS-equipped VFR or IFR aircraft, using the existing coordination crosslink on the 
1090 MHz frequency to ensure compatible resolution maneuvers. If the VFR or IFR aircraft are not 
equipped with TCAS, the logic assumes they will continue on their current trajectory and the AFR aircraft 
will maneuver accordingly. The communication link for sending ownship intent information to ATC could 
also be used to receive intent information on IFR aircraft that are being tracked by the airborne surveillance, 
if this service was provided by FAA, similar to Automatic Dependent Surveillance Rebroadcast (ADS-R). 
This intent data could be used in the separation logic to filter out some “state derived” conflicts that the 
intent data shows will not occur, particularly during vertical maneuvering. 
6. Applying “Design Separation” to Reduce UAM Surveillance 
Requirements 
Recent tests by NASA of the UTM TCL-4 system have confirmed the difficulty of surveillance and 
tracking of aircraft in challenging electronic and obstacle rich urban environments, so it is important not to 
have to provide these functions at greater distances or to include larger numbers of aircraft than necessary 
for reliably accomplishing the separation function. Even at higher altitudes, ADS-B capacity will quickly 
be exceeded if used by the huge numbers of envisioned UAM aircraft. What is required is to detect and 
track any aircraft with enough time to predict the miss distance and relative orientation at the closest point 
of approach (CPA) and, if in conflict, automatically maneuver to achieve the design separation value by the 
CPA using normal accelerations and only modest margins. The separation philosophy of vehicle-hosted 
CD&R performed at relatively close range and automated execution without human involvement provides 
for the greatest possible use of the airspace to achieve safe passage and mission assurance for all aircraft 
classes. It works because the AFR aircraft have the entire separation and collision avoidance control loops 
in the automation and no time need be allotted for human recognition and action. In other words, the 
resolution maneuver will begin at the most effective moment to achieve design separation, no sooner or 
later. 
UAM resolution maneuvers will be tempered with vertical accelerations, lateral roll rates, bank angles, 
and longitudinal accelerations that do not unduly alarm passengers during conflict resolution. TCAS, which 
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only resolves vertically, is limited to a ¼ G acceleration when modeling the resolution and provides a good 
starting point for research into the acceptable range of these resolution maneuver parameters. The vertical 
and horizontal accelerations, speeds and displacements used in the resolution models must, of course, be 
within the aircraft’s performance capability. 
Two notional examples will be used to illustrate the relationships among required surveillance, class of 
aircraft in the encounter and applied design separation. In the first example, two UAVcargo (i.e., package 
carrying) drones are in conflict, each weighing less than 55 pounds and flying at 300 feet AGL and 60 
knots. Their encounter is head-on at the same altitude such that the calculated miss distance is zero (i.e. a 
worst-case encounter). The closure speed is 120 knots, and the right of way rules require that each alter 
course to the right. The design separation in this case is 50 feet, so each vehicle must displace to the right 
25 feet by the time they pass. The packages tolerate larger acceleration than humans, and so a rapid 45-
degree bank to the right produces 1.4 Gs. The needed horizontal displacement of 50 feet is achieved in just 
over one second. At the closure speed of 120 knots (203 feet per second), the allotted two seconds to 
establish a track and declare and resolve a conflict plus one second to accomplish the resolution suggests 
that the conflict could be detected and resolved when the two vehicles are approximately 650 feet apart at 
the start and achieve the required 50 foot separation after maneuvering onto their safe headings.  This 
example is intended to illustrate the approximate scales involved in such a worst-case encounter.  In 
practice, additional margins would be applied to account for onboard compliance monitoring and various 
contingencies. 
In a second example, a UAVpax (i.e., passenger-carrying UAM eVTOL) at 4000 feet flying at 150 knots 
is head-on with an arriving Southwest 737 at the same altitude flying at 250 knots and operating under IFR. 
Here, IFR separation applies, and since the airliner has right of way, the AFR UAVpax must create 1000-
foot vertical separation or three miles of lateral separation using a maneuver that does not alarm the 
passengers of either aircraft. The disproportionate shape of IFR protected airspace (see Figure 1) strongly 
favors the use of a vertical resolution when the projected miss distance is zero. This illustration, while not 
exactly to scale (i.e., the VFR and UAVcargo protected airspaces are slightly larger than scale), is intended 
to convey understanding of the impact of applying our traditional separation values for IFR and VFR 
operations. Thus, in this example, it is only necessary to move 1000 feet vertically rather than more than 
18,000 feet horizontally. Using the same relationship as above, the needed surveillance range in this 
encounter is: 
RS = VR(TD + TR) 
where RS is the needed surveillance range; 
VR is the relative velocity; 
TD is the time to detect that a conflict exists, calculate the time to CPA, determine the direction and 
magnitude of the miss distance at CPA, and compute the resolution maneuver; and 
TR is the time to perform the maneuver and resolve the conflict. 
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In the current example, the UAV can comfortably climb or descend at 1000 feet per minute so the time 
to resolve is just over 60 seconds. The time to detect and compute is the same two seconds as the first 
example, for a total of 62 seconds. At the closing speed of 400 knots, the needed surveillance range in this 
example is 675 feet per second times 62 seconds, or 41,850 ft (6.9 NM), plus three miles to accomplish the 
altitude change before encountering the cylindrical protected airspace, or roughly 10 miles total. It should 
be noted that the separation system surveillance radio frequency can be protected and its computational 
capacity not exceeded by using a variable surveillance range that is a function of the maximum relative 
velocities that may be encountered in the airspace, thus limiting the number of aircraft trajectories that must 
be tracked and modeled at any given time. The 200-knot speed limit exists at the lowest altitude followed 
by the 250-knot limit below 10,000 feet MSL to unlimited speed above 10,000 feet MSL. Traffic densities 
also decrease with increasing altitude, so that when the longer-range surveillance is required, the lower 
traffic density still limits the number of aircraft that must be simultaneously tracked, and their trajectories 
modeled. 
Three aspects that characterize the UAM adaptive separation solution are: (1) variable surveillance range 
and tailored design separation values to match the traffic environment, (2) the ownship and traffic aircraft 
class (e.g. cargo vs. passenger, unpiloted vs. piloted), and (3) the operating rules being used by the traffic 
aircraft in the conflict. Since the navigation system knows the altitude and the class of airspace being 
traversed, it is possible to know the maximum speed of any traffic that will be encountered in the airspace. 
That maximum speed, coupled with the speed of ownship, determines the necessary surveillance range as 
illustrated above. This limits the number of aircraft that must be tracked by ownship surveillance. Knowing 
the class and the operating rules (VFR, IFR or AFR) of the other aircraft determines the design separation 
value that must be used in the resolution of any detected conflict. The calculated miss distance used in 
conjunction with the protected airspace appropriate to the conflict determines both the resolution maneuver 
that will be used, and the time to begin that maneuver. 
Collision avoidance logic takes over whenever the target aircraft differ from what was modeled by a 
chosen value in the direction that decreases separation. For example, if the logic called for the traffic aircraft 
to maneuver and pass a certain distance behind ownship, and the surveillance shows that the modeled 
maneuver is not being followed and design separation will not be achieved by the traffic aircraft, ownship 
collision avoidance takes over. At this point, three things change. The resolution logic attempts to increase 
the predicted separation at the CPA in whatever dimension can achieve this first. The second change is that 
the speed and acceleration imposed by the avoidance maneuver is increased and the direction is determined 
by remaining performance capability (what direction will produce the greatest miss distance). The third 
change is the addition of explicit coordination with the traffic aircraft if it is equipped with TCAS or is 
IFR 
radar 
VFR 
visual 
UAVC 
AFR 
Figure 1. The disproportionate geometry of protected airspace around vehicles generally favor vertical 
resolutions for UAM encounters with VFR and IFR aircraft. 
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operating under AFR. This coordination ensures that any maneuver by the traffic aircraft will be compatible 
with that of ownship. There is no change proposed to the surveillance means aboard the aircraft, but the 
update rate should be increased to the maximum capability to improve the trajectory modeling, and the 
range reduced to more clearly focus on the impending collision situation. 
One other change to collision avoidance enabled by the nature of eVTOLs is that the longitudinal 
dimension (speed up or slow down) is considered in the resolution calculation. This could be analogous to 
a full braking stop in a car. 
7. Conclusion 
Autonomous Flight Rules are well suited to managing very large volumes of dense traffic where mixed 
VFR, IFR and AFR traffic are operating simultaneously. As described here for UAM use in autonomous 
eVTOL aircraft, the separation logic will directly control the flight guidance system, removing any delay 
normally associated with human response times present in pilots and the conventional air traffic control 
loop. Even with the rather large separation standards used among IFR flights, this method was shown to 
permit adherence to these standards within the parameters of the tactical separation algorithms. AFR, by 
using the principles of state-based prediction and implicit coordination, is capable of tactically resolving 
any conflict that may occur in the mixed airspace. No special lanes, routes or segregated airspace of any 
kind need be established, thus providing the maximum flexibility of operations for all airspace users. This 
flexibility ensures the ability of all operators to optimize their flights to maximize battery reserves, 
minimize missed arrival slots and diversions, and ensure safety of passengers and the public below. 
It is suggested that further research be conducted to the application of AFR to UAM vehicles using 
onboard separation automation following the principles outlined in this paper. The values chosen for design 
separation in each circumstance should be experimentally verified for their operational acceptability, and 
the maneuvering capability of specific eVTOL types should be used to validate the separation algorithms 
themselves. Some of this work can be performed in simulation and some parts will need to be done on 
piloted experimental flights to evaluate the subjective acceptability of the chosen values for design 
separation, maximum angular velocity, and separation maneuvering rates. The development of combined 
solid-state airborne radar and electro-optical sensing for visual surveillance of non-cooperative targets must 
be accelerated to enable routine use of the Class G and E airspace by autonomous vehicles without 
impacting the VFR flights that currently dominate this airspace. The use of experimental piloted flights in 
light aircraft during VMC can facilitate the research and development of both the necessary surveillance 
systems and validate the AFR tactical separation logic at the same time. That will assist in achieving the 
low cost, weight and power requirements necessary for this concept to be economically viable on eVTOLs. 
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Addendum: Analysis of Foundational Prerequisites  
Reference [3] presented a concept of operations for UAM with a concentration on the traffic 
management aspect of those operations. The focus of the concept was on flights below 500 feet AGL in 
which piloted flights are rare except in the short segments right after takeoff and just before landing. Recent 
documents describing these operations call this UTM airspace. The current publication addresses the traffic 
management aspects of autonomous UAS flights in the airspace above 500 feet AGL shared with many 
piloted aircraft operating under either VFR or IFR. It proposes the application of ABTM (i.e., Airborne 
Trajectory Management) and AFR (i.e., Autonomous Flight Rules) to UAM operations in both UTM and 
ATM airspace. ABTM was originally proposed for conventional piloted aircraft, progressing through a 
series of increasingly capable steps in cockpit automation from traffic-aware trajectory optimization to self-
separation in an environment of mixed flight rules traffic [4].  AFR was proposed as a mechanism to clearly 
define the manner in which self-separation operations could be integrated in ATM airspace without 
disrupting either IFR of VFR procedures being used in that same airspace [5]. This addendum addresses 
their foundational prerequisites, many of which are not unique to ABTM/AFR but would be required by 
any UAM operating concept. 
These operational concepts rely on several foundational prerequisites for their success. Unless these 
prerequisites are ready for implementation near the start of UAM services on a large scale with adequate 
reliability and at reasonable cost, these concepts for UAM are unlikely to be realized. This addendum lists 
and describes 12 foundational prerequisites for applying ABTM to UAM. The analysis includes high-level 
requirements for use in UAM, assesses their current state of development and Technical Readiness Level 
(TRL), suggests additional development where necessary, and postulates how the UAM concept would be 
limited without these capabilities being in place. Most of these prerequisites are not unique to ABTM and 
AFR, but rather would apply to any concept for UAM traffic management. Table A1 lists the 12 
prerequisites analyzed for ABTM as applied to UAM. 
Table A1. List of foundational prerequisites analyzed for ABTM as applied to UAM. 
Foundational Prerequisites 
Needed for 
UAM w/ 
ABTM 
Needed 
for Any 
UAM  
Estimated 
TRL 
NASA 
Research 
Needed 
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) x x 9 Low 
ADS-B x x 9,6 Med 
On-board Radar and Visual Surveillance Systems x x 5-6 Low 
Common Separation Algorithms x  4 High 
Fully Autonomous Vehicles x x 2 High 
Automated Weather Sensors x x 9 Low 
High Number of Takeoff and Landing areas x x 9 Low 
Use of Tau in Collision Avoidance x x 3-4 Med 
Speed as a Collision Avoidance Mode x x 4 High 
Scalability to High Traffic Density x x 5 High 
Dynamic Obstruction Database x x 8 Low 
Resilient Performance in All Foreseeable Failure 
Modes 
x x 3 High 
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A. GNSS: Global Navigation Satellite System  
The UAM concepts in reference [3] and the current publication presume that GPS will be the primary 
navigation source for the air vehicles. As a source for civilian applications, GPS now has two civil 
frequencies for navigation to make jamming and spoofing more difficult. Other GNSS constellations are 
reaching operational readiness, offering even more redundancy for civil users. Galileo, GLONASS and 
Beidou navigation satellites are now operational and manufacturers are producing receivers that can access 
and use multiple constellations of satellites. Both local and wide area augmentation are operational in the 
U.S., providing the integrity and accuracy for high reliability, precision navigation tasks. For these reasons, 
GNSS should provide the necessary coverage, reliability and accuracy for nearly all UAM navigation tasks. 
Landing and departing from pinpoint spot locations throughout the metro area requiring sub-meter accuracy 
will likely require electronic visual confirmation using Electro-Optical/ Infrared (EO/IR) sensing during 
the final few feet of descent. Also, when operating inside buildings, under rooves and perhaps near street 
level with high rise buildings on all sides, GNSS signals may be compromised or occasionally non-existent. 
However, extensive experience of motorists and pedestrians on the streets and sidewalks of all major cities 
has proven this is not a serious limitation, and GPS is generally available for all but indoor use. The U.S. 
government is now actively pursuing a GPS backup for Precision Navigation and Timing (PNT). In indoor 
environments, visual and primary radar navigation, augmented with map database information appropriate 
to the area of operation may be required, and has been demonstrated experimentally. But for the envisioned 
kinds of UAM flights that do not include flying indoors, the GNSS constellations are adequate and mature. 
The vulnerabilities of GPS that received so much attention a decade ago when it was the sole operational 
navigation constellation and contained a single civil frequency have largely been, or are being, overcome 
through redundancy and technical upgrades on the newer satellites and GNSS receivers. As commercial 
aviation has become more dependent on GNSS for its needs, these vulnerabilities have been systematically 
addressed and many electronic navigation aids have been declared unnecessary and decommissioned as a 
result, because of the availability and widespread aviation use of GNSS. Most airline and many General 
Aviation (GA) aircraft have inertial reference systems for attitude and heading reference and these can 
provide a period of “coasting” navigation capability, even after a failure of GPS signals. For UAM vehicles, 
as for piloted aircraft, the Wide Area Augmentation Service (WAAS) in the U.S. assures system integrity. 
As a result, GPS navigation is approved by the FAA for all flight environments, for both VFR and IFR 
operations. The TRL for GNSS is estimated at 9. No further development of this system is required for its 
use in UAM. 
B. ADS-B: Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast 
All flights within the airspace now requiring ATC transponders will be required to have operating ADS-
B Out equipment after January 1, 2020. That includes Class A, B and C airspace and the Class E airspace 
above 10,000 feet MSL. For UAM, the Class B and C airspace will be extensively used, thus requiring the 
approved ADS-B equipment under current rules. ADS-B is a defined surveillance system standardized by 
the RTCA and specified in their two publications, DO-260 B and DO-282B for use of the 1090 MHz 
transponder and the 978 MHz Universal Access Transceiver, respectively. The airborne transponder 
avionics equipment itself is approved under TSO-166b and TSO-154c. These systems are widely used in 
current operations. 
The ABTM for UAM concept includes a differentiation between UAS operations below 500 feet AGL 
and those at and above that altitude. Even though Class B and C airspace extends upward from the surface 
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inside the inner area and cooperative surveillance is required out to 30 NM for the major airports listed in 
FAR Part 91 appendix D, the concept assumes an exemption for UAS flights below 500 feet in Class B and 
C from the requirement for ADS-B and, in Class B, from requiring an ATC clearance. Separation of UAVs 
from piloted aircraft is proposed to be accomplished by geofencing the takeoff and landing corridors at 
airports within Class B airspace and providing right of way to all piloted aircraft. It is expected that the tens 
of thousands of small UAS (mainly package delivery) operating within 400 feet of the surface in a single 
metropolitan area will far exceed the capacity of the ADS-B frequencies, rendering the 1090 MHz 
frequency unusable even for ATC and TCAS use. For that reason, “ADS-B like” surveillance is proposed 
in ABTM for these very low altitude, very high-density operations. FAA announced their intention to 
require the broadcast of identity and position by all UAS in a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking expected out 
in October 2019. However, no means for accomplishing this was given in the announcement. EmbraerX 
has proposed in their “Flight Plan 2030” that merely reducing the power of standard ADS-B may not be 
enough to satisfy the requirement and they suggest using another frequency in the aeronautical band. Some 
in Europe, Korea and Japan have been experimenting with the 4G LTE networks for surveillance because 
it is ubiquitous in urban environments and should enable high-density operations. The 3rd Generation 
Partnership Project tested 4G LTE for this purpose and found that it works well near the ground, but its 
performance degrades with altitude because of direct line interference and handover problems between cell 
towers. There are fixes proposed for the issues, but they are not yet implemented [18]. 
The purpose of drone-to-drone, and drone-to-ground surveillance is for separation and traffic control, 
of course, but an examination of FAR 91.225 that sets forth the accuracy and integrity requirements for 
ADS-B position and velocity source information shows that these values are quite high, sufficient for 
standard IFR separation and DAA, but not precise enough to support the small separations described in [3]. 
The use of WAAS-augmented GNSS is certainly capable of the necessary accuracy and integrity, but the 
specifications for equipment used on these drones to separate themselves from each other need to be drawn 
up with this in mind, as merely complying with 91.225 will not suffice. To support separation values as low 
as 25 feet (7.6 meters) a Required Navigation Performance (RNP) of about 2 meters would be required. An 
“ADS-B like” service must be demonstrated to provide this precision, and the rules created to reflect that 
requirement. The technical readiness assessment for ADS-B is divided between those operations 500 feet 
AGL and above in “mixed airspace” and the high-density drone operations within 400 feet of the surface. 
The former is estimated to have a TRL of 9, and the latter, a 6. Prototype ADS-B-like service has been 
demonstrated in operational environments with varying degrees of success, but the final configuration and 
standards for hardware and software systems must still be determined and implemented. This process will 
likely take three to five years. Without this in place, high volume, low altitude UAM operations will not be 
possible. 
C. On -Board Radar and Visual Systems 
Assuming the FAA requirement for broadcasting identification and position from all UAS becomes law 
in the future, an “ADS-B Like” service is sure to emerge. That system will provide the primary surveillance 
means to ensure drone-to-drone separation using ABTM but, of course, obstacles will not participate, and 
at very close range between vehicles, visual angular location and radar ranging will provide better 
positioning and far less latency than ADS-B. Since drones were invented to provide visual imaging services, 
the sensors being used on them today often have the necessary accuracy and integrity to provide this 
function; but again, there are not yet standards and specifications for these to ensure the desired level of 
safety when these sensors are used for separation and collision avoidance. 
The functions described in [3] that must be supported by primary radar and visual systems include DAA 
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service for encounters with piloted VFR aircraft not equipped with ADS-B Out, intentional operations down 
to 50-foot separation between autonomous vehicles, scanning for obstacles, people, pets and vehicles before 
landing or taking off from private vertiports located in both commercial and residential neighborhoods, 
avoiding obstacles, both stationary and in motion that are not charted in any obstacle database, and for 
collision avoidance from any such obstacles and any other non-cooperative airborne vehicles or vehicles 
on the surface. 
Drone cameras are often gyro stabilized and have very high resolution to support their surveillance 
function of things and events taking place on the ground. But they almost never have totally spherical 
coverage, meaning that they can’t constantly surveil objects at any azimuth and elevation from the ownship 
vehicle. Most airborne primary radar systems are also limited in their field of view. One such device that 
was designed without this limitation is called “Unicorn”TM, consisting of top and bottom arrays of radar 
“horns” to detect passive targets with complete coverage around the aircraft. It is possible to use such a 
spherical coverage radar to detect the passive target, accurately measure its range and steer the camera to 
its location for better classification, identification and to more accurately track its angular relative position. 
This combined data can then be used by the autonomous vehicle’s separation and collision avoidance 
algorithms to determine and execute the proper response to the target’s presence. 
A combined radar/optical sensor should be able to place objects in the field of view to sub-meter 
accuracy in near real time at close range. Developments in the autonomous automobile world have made 
this capability a reality with some companies also using Lidar to map the environment, but these 
technologies would need to be adapted to the needs of UAM vehicle operations through continued 
developmental activity. Autonomous cars can get by with a shorter visual horizon than UAS and they will 
spend less time in fog (i.e., clouds) restricting visibility. The radar and the visual system will need enough 
range to support the collision avoidance software and may need infrared sensing when operating at night, 
or in haze and cloud conditions. 
Besides spherical coverage, the range and angular measurement requirements for radar/optical 
surveillance augmentation are related to the maneuvering and minimum design values for separation and 
collision avoidance. Using simple Tau (i.e., range divided by range rate) set equal to the time to achieve the 
design separation when maneuvering from a predicted collision, the range requirement for any probable 
closure speed is easily calculated. The maximum closure for VFR below 10,000 feet would be 500 knots 
in a head on, and 400 knots below Class B airspace. Using a worst case 15 second Tau, the required 
detection range is about 1.4 nautical miles. That is considerably more than required for autonomous cars so 
the radar and visual technologies developed for the cars would have to be tested at greater ranges for their 
effectiveness. Because of this adaptation risk, the TRL for radar/optical sensors for UAM is estimated 
between 5 and 6. This required research and testing is likely to take place within existing drone industry 
partners, without requiring government funding. If it is not ready for operational use in time, the effect will 
be that larger design separation values will have to be used. Since the number of UAM vehicles will only 
grow over time, that limitation will not soon be serious, and should be overcome with the needed 
surveillance capability once the density gets so high that the smaller separations are needed. 
D. Common Separation Algorithms 
Autonomous UAM vehicles will encounter piloted aircraft, both VFR and IFR, and unpiloted aircraft 
with or without human cargo on board and must stay safely and legally separated from all of them. The 
operational concept in the main body of this publication calls for the separation applied in each instance to 
adapt to the specific type of operation of the target vehicle. For example, standard IFR separation provided 
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by the on-board separation system will be maintained from piloted IFR flights. DAA rules found in DO-
365 will be used to separate UAM vehicles from piloted VFR flights, and “Omega separation”, described 
in [3] will be applied to unpiloted flights with human occupants. Separation between unoccupied drone 
flights will adapt the DAA model to use the smallest supportable design separation values determined 
through analysis, simulation and flight test, targeting around 50 feet, horizontal and/or vertical, to achieve 
the highest airspace capacity and operator flexibility.  
Both Omega separation and the minimum design separation are yet undefined in RTCA standards, but 
the maneuvers used to establish and maintain separation must be compatible among all autonomous UAS 
to prevent independent, incompatible maneuvers from creating a loss of design separation. Currently, low-
altitude small UAS (sUAS) operations are separated by airspace reservation of the entire intended operating 
area to intentionally prevent traffic encounters using strategic separation. This is accomplished using the 
service of one of the USS. The near instant approval of operations in the NAS using one of these third-party 
service providers, such as AirMap, works very well with the low number of drone operations now extant. 
This method is not scalable, however, and it does not apply to drone operations above 400 feet AGL (outside 
of UTM airspace). Autonomous air-to-air tactical separation will be needed to accommodate higher altitude 
flights encountering other drones and piloted flights, as well as orders of magnitude increases in drone 
traffic. Some work is taking place in the NASA UTM TCL-4 trials to enable multiple drones in the same 
airspace, but the process is still strategic. No standards yet exist for tactical separation algorithms now being 
used experimentally for collision avoidance, or as used in the NASA Autonomous Operations Planner 
(AOP) research prototype automation system for airborne separation [19]. It is proposed that such standards 
be developed and agreed through the RTCA and Eurocae processes. The drone industry, through its strong 
cooperation with NASA, could support this activity if it moves fast enough to keep up with other UAM 
developments and the public’s desire for drone services. If this activity is not undertaken, then the existing 
DAA standards would likely be imposed by FAA on all drone-to-drone encounters, resulting in a drastic 
reduction in potential airspace capacity. 
Autonomous separation maneuvers and right-of-way rules, at a high level, should be based upon the 
FAA standard rules presented in FAR 91.113 and enhanced to allow algorithmic determination of right of 
way based on the exact geometry of the encounter where the rules now use the term “or nearly so.” Thus, 
“converging encounters” would have the convergence angle specified to differentiate them from “head-on” 
and “overtaking” encounters. Similarly, converging in the vertical or a combined horizontal/vertical sense 
would have precise algorithmic resolutions determined by the encounter geometry, as would non-linear 
encounters. Another difference from the piloted right-of-way rules could allow passing over, under or in 
front of the target aircraft while maintaining design separation among autonomous drones. Those 
prohibitions in the regulation were included to prevent the appearance of hazard to human pilots operating 
in visual conditions and would not be applicable to autonomous UAS. The priority to landings over takeoff 
and surface operations should be retained from the Part 91 rules, but priority to the lower aircraft on 
approach should be replaced by the closer to estimated time of arrival (ETA) at the landing spot. 
NASA’s work on self-separation using AFR and the creation of the AOP software tool to provide 
separation guidance has provided a strong base of knowledge from which to continue this line of research. 
The AOP work concentrated more heavily on longer-term trajectory-based separation appropriate for 
transport aircraft, so the separation algorithms would need to be optimized for the UAM application. There 
would also need to be multiple separation modes available to accommodate the adaptive separation values 
in ABTM. Because of the extensive fast-time and piloted simulations run using the AOP, balanced against 
the need to adapt this method to the UAM autonomous vehicles, the TRL for this item is estimated at 4. 
This is clearly an area in which NASA can provide a valuable research contribution that is not likely to be 
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accomplished soon by outside industry. If this work is not undertaken, the drone industry will be restricted 
from growth for a long time using small improvements to the strategic separation, provided by airspace 
reservations via third party, now being employed. 
E. Fully Autonomous Vehicles 
Other concepts for UAM in the literature describe a progression of eVTOL air taxi services beginning 
with human pilots on board, transitioning to remote human pilots and finally to autonomous vehicles as the 
safety case is built. Whether the pilot is on board or remote, the piloted phases of this economic model 
resemble existing air taxi operations using piloted airplanes and helicopters. It is a service so expensive that 
it is only used by a few people with special needs that justify the high cost. There is no reason to believe 
that piloted eVTOLs carrying only a few passengers would have different economics. Therefore, UAM will 
never put a dent in relieving surface congestion until the vehicles become truly autonomous. The few 
passengers that can afford this service will avoid the ground congestion, but the congestion will remain. 
That is why the autonomous model for UAM is proposed in references [3] and this publication. 
To realize the goal of UAM, autonomy must be pursued from the start. The dangers of fielding an 
unproven, fully autonomous UAS are well understood, of course, and now hotly debated in the autonomous 
automobile industry. A serious fatal accident involving an autonomous vehicle could trigger a backlash that 
grounds the industry for a very long time. A more reasonable progression from basic to advanced services 
in the air taxi model would begin with unoccupied package delivery services using vehicles small and light 
enough to use automatic parachute recovery for all unmitigated contingencies. As vehicle design 
improvements and on-board artificial intelligence improved to the point where most contingencies are 
resolved without a complete mission abort, larger, higher weight vehicles could be added to the mix. Once 
enough flight data is accumulated to prove the safety of autonomous operations at a level required for 
passenger flight services, they would begin, backed by a then extensive period of experience in resolving 
anomalous conditions involving vehicle failures, adverse weather, unforeseen traffic situations and 
conditions on the ground operational sites. 
Another weakness of other UAM concepts of operation is the extensive communications infrastructure 
required for command and control (C2), and for surveillance. If the vehicles are not autonomous, any loss 
of the C2 link is potentially catastrophic. Surveillance needed for vehicle separation and traffic management 
using ground sensors would be extremely difficult to establish given the low altitudes used by these flights 
and the presence of obstructions and multipath in the operating environment. By contrast, autonomous 
vehicles using ADS-B and “ADS-B-Like” equipment could reliably perform self-separation at close range 
with low power, thus mitigating the potential for frequency saturation from great numbers of vehicles in 
very close proximity. They would also do it with a far smaller radio spectrum requirement. 
Air taxi services requiring the equivalent of Airline Operational Control for flight planning, dispatch, 
flight-following and contingency management have been proposed, but this concept also suffers from the 
need for multiple personnel and expensive facilities and communications systems to function. The surface 
taxi models Uber and Lyft are successful because all the vehicle dispatch, routing, scheduling and payment 
is accomplished over the internet through the app. Fully autonomous air taxi vehicles should use similar 
automated support services, perhaps growing out of the USS community. At the pick-up site, the vehicle 
would have a prominent sign on the door, “stand back” until the vehicle was ready, then the door would 
open and a “board now” sign would illuminate. Inside the vehicle, the destination previously entered on the 
customer’s phone would appear on a display with a “confirm” request, and any seats with weight in them 
would be sensed to ensure the seat belt was fastened before the vehicle departed. 
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Full autonomy is rare in the UAS world today, but the government is encouraging its development and 
testing. Both the 2018 National Defense Strategy and the 2019 National Defense Appropriations Act 
mandate that the Services develop, test, and implement autonomous and artificial intelligence (AI) systems. 
The Air Force sponsored testing of John’s Hopkins University’s “Testing of Autonomy in Complex 
Environments” (TACE) they call “middleware” that monitors commands sent to a UAV autopilot to ensure 
their safety, then sends the aircraft state information back to the AI. In March of 2019 they were able to 
demonstrate the TACE system’s ability to re-direct an aircraft to a safety area as it approached a virtual 
border, and the ability to track a simulated vehicle on the ground without human commands. The TACE 
uses open systems architecture, allowing the testing of third-party AI algorithms [20].  
The Flirtey Company, working with the University of Nevada in Reno, demonstrated the first “fully 
autonomous, FAA-approved urban drone delivery in the US” in March 2019. In an uninhabited residential 
setting in Hawthorne, Nevada, a six-rotor drone flew a predetermined path and lowered a package 
containing food, water and a first aid kit right on target in the urban setting [21]. While claiming a “first” 
for autonomy, it is still a long way from doing the flight planning, the weather analysis and coping with any 
and all contingencies that might arise, all autonomously, on board as described in the ABTM for UAM 
concept. 
Many companies working alone, in teams and teaming with NASA, FAA and the military are pushing 
hard to advance the state of the art for drone autonomy, but there is still a long way to go to achieve the 
UAM autonomous vision. Creating this autonomy through functional AI software and hardware is a strong 
area for NASA to provide research, guidance and leadership over the next seven to ten years. This item, in 
the list of foundational prerequisites, has the lowest estimated TRL of 2. There is time to do this 
development before regular use of autonomous air taxis exists. If it is not done, UAM will never progress 
beyond a niche service to a true economic and transportation revolution. 
F. Automated Weather Sensors 
Because of their low speed and low disk loading, eVTOL aircraft are particularly impacted by turbulent 
air conditions. Along with strong winds and precipitation, turbulence along the flight path is the most 
difficult challenge to cope with. A high degree of control authority is required to counteract the effects of 
turbulence and maintain a stable attitude and flight trajectory, something in which all aircraft, both piloted 
and unpiloted, are limited. It is, therefore, very important for the autonomous vehicles to have access to 
current wind information from which turbulence probability can be calculated. Direct sensing of turbulence 
severity, such as the eddy dissipation rate (EDR), would be valuable if measured at the scale appropriate 
for the UAV in question. 
Automated weather sensing systems are a mature technology and in widespread use at airports both 
large and small across the country. The FAA’s automated weather program started with the Automated 
Weather Observing System (AWOS) that provided the required parameters to pilots using an airport via 
synthetic voice recording, to free up airport control frequencies and ATC personnel from this task.  More 
recent installations are Automated Surface Observing System (ASOS) and Automated Weather Sensing 
System (AWSS). They are both the same system, but the latter was re-named in a follow-on acquisition and 
installation program. These systems are being installed on a nation-wide basis in a joint effort by the 
National Weather Service, FAA, and Department of Defense. The voice broadcasts of weather information 
may be received out to 25 miles and up to 10,000 feet. ASOS and AWSS also include a data output of the 
sensed weather information distributed on national communication networks that can be used by automation 
systems on the surface and by software resident in aircraft. The list below gives the sensed parameters 
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available from these systems: 
• Cloud Height 
• Visibility 
• Precipitation 
• Freezing Rain 
• Pressure 
• Temperature and Dew Point 
• Wind direction and Speed 
• Rainfall Accumulation 
• Automatic Lightning Detection and Reporting System (ALDARS) 
 
The needs of autonomous UAVs for the weather data to do flight planning and operational decision 
making are somewhat different from the needs of piloted aircraft. There is no need for the voice broadcast 
and several of the existing weather parameters are not necessary either. As they will operate autonomously 
in both IMC and VMC, cloud height and visibility are not necessary.  A visibility of a few meters is enough 
to confirm the safety of the landing area and this is far below the threshold of current visibility sensors. 
Eliminating the cloud height and visibility sensors, the rainfall accumulation, the ALDARS and the voice 
broadcast portion of the AWSS would provide significant savings in the cost of these installations. This is 
important because even in the larger metropolitan areas, there are only a few such stations currently installed 
for the needs of piloted aircraft. For UAM there will be a need for the remaining weather parameters plus 
turbulence to be reported on a much finer grid throughout the area. For example, if they were placed in a 1 
nautical mile grid within the DFW 30-mile veil, there would be over 2800 of them. Clearly there is a need 
to define a much lower cost AWSS for UAM that would be self-sustaining (probably solar powered) and 
very low maintenance. The spinning anemometer could be replaced with solid state wind sensors, for 
example. In high rise downtown areas, both rooftop and ground level sensors may be needed because of 
the venturi effect of closely spaced tall structures amplifying the prevailing wind near the surface. 
The weather parameters that are most important to UAM operations are first the wind (and its turbulence 
derivative); then temperature, dew point and atmospheric pressure (to calculate density altitude); and then 
precipitation, including when it is freezing rain or drizzle. UAM vehicles are not likely to tolerate any 
structural icing. These sensors could be mounted atop single poles about 20 feet high and equipped to 
communicate via the cell networks to the user community. Most could be located on public land or existing 
utility poles to save on real estate costs. Since turbulence intensity is so important in UAM, the appropriate 
EDR must be calculated or measured, perhaps using orthogonal hot wire anemometers and a short period 
algorithm to analyze the three-dimensional wind variations. Each UAV type would be certified for the 
maximum wind gust it could tolerate and the maximum turbulence intensity that it could safely navigate in 
the airspace, based on its performance and control authority. Comparing the weather conditions on the 
intended trajectory to the aircraft limits would inform the go, no-go decision software. Once in flight, the 
conditions ahead would determine the “continue” or “divert/abort” decision at regular intervals. The dense 
array of sensors would make it possible to detect an advancing gust front that would ground UAM 
operations before it was ever experienced at the vehicles themselves. There would need to be some sensors 
placed outside the normal UAM operating area to protect the edge operations. 
This is another example of a mature technology requiring adaptation to meet the needs of the UAM 
operators. Miniaturization of the sensors to minimize size and power requirements, inclusion of just those 
weather parameters needed for UAM and the data communication medium appropriate to this function need 
to be determined and agreed in the community. NASA leadership is required here also, and even though 
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the underlying technology is at TRL 9, this adaptation and the standardization of it will require several 
years of focused effort, either in the UAS community or through RTCA. Failure to employ a dense array 
of weather sensors will not invalidate ABTM for UAM, but it will delay its growth. 
G. High Number of Takeoff and Landing Areas 
The ABTM for UAM concept calls for a very high number of takeoff and landing areas throughout the 
metropolitan operating area. While some UAM concept descriptions have proposed dozens of such sites, 
the ABTM concept calls for thousands of sites. This is a direct result of the business case for UAM. UAM 
will never be more than a research project unless the operations are economically viable and the services 
provided live up to the promise of the vision, i.e., to provide faster transport of goods and people from 
origin to destination than is possible today using ground transportation, for a comparable cost.  If UAM 
were merely to insert another mode of transport into the middle of the journey, still requiring a transfer to, 
say, an Uber ground taxi, the advantage is lost. Thus, concepts requiring people and goods to gather at a 
few distribution centers to be flown to a few locations scattered throughout the city where another transfer 
takes place to get the customer or the package to the final destination do not save the time or the cost 
required for this type of UAM to be viable. Instead, package deliveries by drone must be to the address of 
the recipient and if it is not possible to land there, then the package must be lowered from the vehicle to the 
ground on a tether. Passenger carrying autonomous air taxis must be able to pick up and drop off from at 
least as many locations as there are stops on a city bus route so that the passengers can reasonably expect 
to reach their final destinations on foot. UAM must be a replacement for ground transportation, not a new 
intermediate mode in the journey. 
Another reason for the high number of sites is to abrogate the need for TFM of drone traffic, as now 
exists for airline traffic at the very few air carrier airports in the country. Taking a delay in a drone delivery, 
no matter where or how it is taken, also destroys the business case for the service. By flying between a 
myriad of origin and destination points desired by the customer, there will be very little competition for use 
of these sites, and thus no need for TFM delays. This is directly analogous to GA flights among the 
thousands of small airports around the country that never are so busy that TFM is needed to manage a 
capacity/demand mismatch. 
That being the case, there is still a question of whether it is technically and operationally feasible to 
designate enough takeoff and landing sites to make the whole concept work. An examination of this 
question is split into two parts, one for the package delivery services and the other for air taxi or passenger 
services. Taking package delivery first, there is an initial assumption that the FAR Part 107 vehicle weight 
limitation of 55 pounds will be applied to these operations. It is unlikely that the payload of these drones 
will exceed 50 percent of the total vehicle weight, so packages that weigh more than 28 pounds are not 
considered in the discussion that follows. 
Package carriers, such as UPS, Fedex, Amazon and the U.S. Postal Service all have multiple distribution 
centers around the metropolitan area that gather, sort and distribute the goods around the city from the long-
haul ground or airline transportation that brought them from the sender. The UAM service is intended to 
replace the ground vehicles that currently accomplish the intra-city distribution that follows. The box carrier 
distribution centers will need to have many launch and recovery platforms to be used by their drones, as 
envisioned in the beehive patent issued to Amazon in 2017. On the other end, every person and business in 
the city to whom a package is sent has a street address that is shown on the package. If the address is a 
detached home, the package can be lowered to the street side or the back side of the home, as designated 
by the addressee. If it is a building without a yard, such as an apartment building, a small business or a 
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corporate high rise, the building owner must designate a delivery 
spot and mark it appropriately, visually and electronically. This 
could be on the roof of some buildings or somewhere around the 
perimeter on the ground, such as a fenced off area in the parking 
lot for the building. Package pickup can take place from the same 
locations. The only ground infrastructure required for these sites 
would be a visual marker such as shown in Figure A1, also 
containing a patch transponder, like the ones stuck to a car’s 
windshield to be read at high speed on toll roads. The visual 
marker would be to permit precise navigation by the drone during 
the last few feet for pickup and delivery and to confirm the spot is 
not occupied for safety at the time of use. The transponder would 
confirm the address of the customer and could indicate 
accomplishment of pickup or delivery. 
UAM air taxis, by contrast, will weigh several thousand 
pounds, generate more noise and pose greater risks to other nearby 
activities than the small package drones. The Uber project has called for a fifty-foot square area to be 
reserved for takeoff and landing of these vehicles. Similar markings and electronic identification could be 
used to designate these areas, but the inability to lower and raise the customers from a hovering drone, as 
may be done with packages, prohibits the operation of these vehicles from every address in the city. 
Accordingly, an automated survey of the metropolitan area could be performed using location identification 
software with an application such as Google Earth to identify for analysis those places that could be used 
for air taxi operations in every neighborhood. The middles of cul-de-sacs, corners of parks and parking lots, 
a portion of the real estate in strip malls and at some private homes with large lots, the air taxi square could 
be designated and fenced. In the city center, most vertiports will be on the top levels of parking garages, on 
rooftops and on piers in the rivers and 
lakes. In some areas, a portion of 
surface parking lots could also be 
used. Figure A2 illustrates how many 
such locations are feasible in varied 
DFW neighborhoods. The goal 
would be to find a potential spot in 
every block. People and businesses 
desiring air taxi service could be 
instrumental in finding and seeking 
approval for sites near them. These 
sites would not provide drone 
services like charging and 
maintenance / inspection / cleaning 
or even passenger services of any 
kind. The latter would be handled in 
the same manner as the existing ride 
services. These spots would, 
however, make point-to-point 
transportation feasible without 
transfer to another mode of transport.  
Figure A1. Residential drone drop off 
location. 
Figure A2. Potential vertiport sites in residential Addison, TX 
and downtown Dallas, TX. 
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This item contains more logistic and legal hurdles than technology challenges. Some successful highly 
publicized deliveries and people movements could produce a groundswell of demand leading to the public 
asking that points of operation be approved at their homes and businesses. The costs for designating spots 
with addresses, painting small markings and installing tiny transponders are truly minimal. Conversely, a 
bad experience could create a public outcry demanding an end to these flights. This item has a TRL of 9 
but is a public relations challenge that is only just beginning. The industry must confront this as soon as 
they realize that without it, the whole UAM economic model collapses. It is not just an ABTM issue. 
H. Use of Tau in Collision Avoidance 
The ABTM concept for UAM calls for the surveillance and trajectory modeling data to be applied in the 
self-separation algorithms, as well as in the collision avoidance logic that is activated if the surveillance 
shows the separation logic is not being adhered to by one or both aircraft in conflict. Tau, the slant range to 
a target divided by range rate (i.e., closure speed), is a basic, instantaneous approximation of time to CPA 
and thus important to separation logic. Modified Tau, used in TCAS logic, separates the horizontal and 
vertical components of aircraft closure such that Tau mod is the estimate of time to the horizontal CPA. It 
is used in conjunction with a value of DMOD, the horizontal distance that will trigger a TCAS alert even 
with very slow, or no, closure. The vertical closure, modeled from successive Mode C altitude reports, also 
checks for a projected value less than the appropriate minimum in the alerting logic. Simultaneous 
triggering values in the horizontal and vertical will trigger a Resolution Advisory. The reference to the use 
of Tau in the separation logic section of [3] was intended only at the highest level of the logic to trigger 
additional modeling of the target’s future trajectory and to assist in prioritizing the threats from the rest of 
the track files. The paragraph erroneously implied that the legacy TCAS logic played a major role in the 
ABTM collision avoidance logic. 
In the low altitude UTM airspace, level flight will be rare as the vehicles are following the terrain and 
obstacles in the vertical. It is probable that a spherical coordinate system fixed within ownship would be 
used in analyzing the target aircraft trajectories for conflict. Simple Tau might be more useful as a basic 
filter in this system than separating it into the horizontal and vertical components. In reference [22], the 
author presents a concept called “Tau-Tau” that works better than simple Tau in filtering conflicts in which 
the encounter geometry will result in a miss by calculating the trajectory that would create a collision and 
using the difference between the measured and collision trajectories to find the Tau-Tau value. That process 
eliminates a lot of the nuisance alarms issued by both basic and modified Tau logic. 
ABTM logic relies heavily on using the velocity vector and its first derivative (for detecting target 
aircraft maneuvering) to model the future trajectory and predict the miss distance and direction that is used 
in declaring a conflict and determining an appropriate avoidance maneuver. This was desired, but not 
possible, when TCAS was being developed. It was not possible because the only angular measurement to 
the target at the time was from the TCAS directional antenna. That was adequate to show the target aircraft 
on a display for situational awareness but not sufficiently accurate to predict the miss distance, or even to 
determine on which side of ownship the passing would take place. Modeling in the vertical using successive 
values of the Mode C altitude report was far more accurate and supported the use of the vertical avoidance 
maneuver, which is still the only dimension used in TCAS today. It is expected that the position and velocity 
vector, included in the ADS-B report, supplemented by EO/IR for angular measurement and primary radar 
for range, can permit accurate miss distance calculations. This will eliminate most nuisance alarms and 
permit much smaller design separation values. 
It is estimated that the TRL for the separation and collision avoidance logic proposed for ABTM is not 
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very mature, probably a 3 or 4. Unfortunately, the concept using ABTM for UAM is very dependent on this 
logic being developed. The UTM work currently in progress is still mostly “airspace reservation-based” 
even when the reserved airspace is dynamically adjusted as the drones perform their missions. True air-to-
air self-separation is mentioned as a desired capability in some reports, but no specifics are given. If this 
development is taking place, it is likely within private companies. Because of the interoperability 
requirement, this development should be sponsored by the government (probably NASA) and the results of 
their research be used to create standards in the RTCA. This activity is crucial to ABTM for UAM. 
I. Speed as a Collision Avoidance Mode 
It was intended in the present concept to point out the difference between TCAS collision avoidance and 
the ABTM for UAM collision avoidance proposed here for eVTOL aircraft. TCAS has a single dimension 
in space used for conflict resolution, the vertical dimension. It was designed to be used on conventional 
piloted aircraft, primarily air carrier aircraft, that have limited maneuvering capability in each of the three 
dimensions. Lateral maneuvers are limited by roll rate and permissible bank angle. Also, when TCAS was 
developed, projecting the lateral miss distance through surveillance was not nearly as accurate as the 
projected vertical miss distance. That is a function of the encoded altitude being broadcast for height 
tracking versus the angular precision of received responses through the TCAS directional antenna for the 
lateral tracking. Vertical tracking was far more precise, thus requiring a smaller displacement from the 
original trajectory to assure a miss. Because of the poor accuracy of the projected lateral miss distance, 
lateral resolution maneuvers, originally to be included in TCAS III, were never implemented. 
Longitudinal trajectory changes (i.e., speed up or slow down) are very limited on transport aircraft, 
particularly at high altitude. Even when the allowable speed range is larger at low altitude, the acceleration 
and deceleration rates are quite small, so this dimension was never considered in TCAS. eVTOL aircraft, 
however, are capable of speeds from zero to their maximum at all of their more limited range of altitudes. 
A combination of ADS-B and ADS-B-Like tracking supplemented with electro-optical and radar tracking 
at short range is capable of supporting trajectory modeling that is precise in all three dimensions. This 
means that the projected miss distance at the closest point of approach will be known in all dimensions and 
the collision avoidance logic will first use the dimension that needs the smallest increase to produce a miss, 
followed by the others if maneuvering by the traffic aircraft negates the effectiveness of the first collision 
avoidance maneuver. It is true that hovering for most UAM vehicles uses more power than forward flight 
and the use of hovering in the concept document was meant to show the availability of all maneuver 
dimensions for UAM collision avoidance, not that hovering would ever be extensively used for that 
purpose. 
The technology associated with UAM collision avoidance is still immature and has been previously 
covered in the sections on Common Separation Algorithms and Use of Tau in Collision Avoidance. Thus, 
the same estimated TRL of 4 is appropriate for this item. Similarly, this is an area where NASA research 
capability is of utmost importance, as the logic must be standardized and applied across all users. Hovering, 
however, is not a necessary prerequisite for ABTM use in UAM. 
J. Scalability to High Traffic Density 
Most UAM concepts put forth to date take a traditional developmental approach to both vehicle control 
and to drone traffic management. The manufacturers of the eVTOL vehicles say that they will initially be 
piloted by humans but are being designed to fly autonomously. The proposals for traffic management 
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include corridors throughout the Class B airspace reserved for drone use and centrally managed reservations 
for the use of airspace and vertiport facilities. This paradigm directly mimics what is done for piloted 
aircraft. It does not properly account for the envisioned numbers of drones and densities of drone traffic 
necessary for UAM to become a major player in the relief of surface congestion within a metropolitan area. 
The ABTM concept for UAM calls for orders of magnitude increases in the numbers of vehicles used 
for intra-city transport and traffic densities unheard of in conventional air traffic management. Each of the 
ATM functions of separation, airspace management and vertiport management will need to be performed 
without human involvement in the control loop, as too many decisions per second will have to be made in 
the performance of these functions. In NASA’s early work on UTM, four TCLs were described with 
increasing capabilities for handling UAS operations at each level. BVLOS with geofencing is introduced, 
then a semi-urban setting, then at TRL-4, true multi-vehicle control in a more challenging urban setting. 
TRL-4 tests were just completed in Reno. NV, and in Corpus Christi, TX. Even here, however, human 
managers use data to make strategic decisions about initiating, continuing and terminating UAS flights to 
ensure that only authenticated UAS are in the airspace. “Multi-vehicle” in these tests meant tens of vehicles, 
not thousands. 
The USS provide strategic and tactical reservations, prioritization of flights and contingency 
management to prevent unsafe multiple operations in the same volume of airspace. But as stated in the 
Airmap R&D 2019 report on NASA UTM TCL 4 trials, “While the results of the NASA-UTM project 
successfully demonstrated the power of UTM to address safety and conflict resolution concerns for drone 
operations in shared airspace, the trials did not address more advanced separation capabilities, including 
separation minima, detect-and-avoid technologies, air- or ground-based collision avoidance, intent-based 
avoidance procedures, and tactical deconfliction at different phases of a drone operation. Future projects 
should evaluate these capabilities in order to build upon the NASA-UTM TCL4 trials” [23]. 
ABTM for UAM calls for a more advanced form of traffic separation and collision avoidance that 
addresses the need stated by Airmap. Air-to-air surveillance supports self-separation, and inter-aircraft 
coordination ensures compatible maneuvers during collision avoidance. These techniques are used 
exclusively outside the geofenced no-fly areas reserved for piloted aircraft takeoffs and landings. This is 
completely tactical separation as opposed to nearly completely strategic separation of each drone’s 
operating area, in use today under UTM. Strategic separation works well in limited areas with small 
numbers of simultaneously airborne drone traffic that characterizes today’s drone operations. It will not 
work when the vehicle numbers are increased ten or one hundred-fold as envisioned for UAM. Tactical 
separation is necessary to enable far greater capacity at far less cost than strategic separation. Air-to-air 
collision avoidance is mentioned in some UTM concept papers, but always within the framework of a 
centralized airspace management and control system. What is meant by the latter is less clear and usually 
not explained. If it is meant to be automatic without human decision making required, it may be 
conceptually feasible, but it would still be more vulnerable to failure and more expensive in terms of 
infrastructure and spectrum use than the ABTM approach to autonomy.  
The use of drones in the US has begun on a very small scale and UTM already exists. There are between 
ten and fourteen USS providing rapid authorization using LAANC for drone flights within controlled 
airspace, while also offering other operational and planning services. Clearly, for UTM to evolve into a 
system like ABTM there must be a consensus among the leaders in the UAS industry and the regulators on 
the direction that evolution should take. UTM, as defined by the FAA in its concept document, only exists 
within 400 feet of the surface. The concept behind ABTM can take UTM from what it currently does to a 
system of systems that accommodates all classes of airspace users in all Classes of airspace. It can do it in 
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a manner that preserves the freedom to fly, accommodates orders of magnitude increases in traffic and, 
above all, contains a viable economic model throughout the growth of the UAM aviation segment. Current 
UTM is operating at about TRL 8, only because of very low traffic densities, but the ABTM model is still 
at TRL 5. NASA has the background knowledge and simulation experience to bring ABTM to a technology 
capability level where it can be used to allow the natural growth of UAS missions and operations without 
imposing the constraints that are artifacts of the human centered ATM system. 
K. Dynamic Obstruction Database 
Autonomous UAM flights will spend a lot of time flying in very low altitude airspace where piloted 
aircraft are very rare. Obstructions abound in this airspace, however, and must be known to the flight 
planning and execution function of the autonomous drones in order not to collide with them in flight. Most 
obstructions are in fixed positions and are mapped in various databases, making it possible to fly missions 
free from hitting obstructions simply by comparing the intended flight path to the appropriate obstruction 
data base. New obstructions are being built all the time and some, like cranes and amusement rides, move 
around and are temporary in nature. These appear in NOTAMS when they are near regular airports but not 
when they don’t impact the airspace navigated by piloted aircraft. Thus, there is a need for a dynamic 
database of all obstructions throughout the UAM operating area. 
In the ABTM operating concept, drones will only be below 50 feet AGL for takeoff and landing, and 
this will be a vertical ascent and descent maneuver at a known vertiport location. Obstructions less than 50 
feet AGL will not be a potential hazard to these operations and therefore, will not need to be included in 
the dynamic obstacle database. The Electronic Terrain and Obstacle Data (eTOD) is a digital representation 
of terrain and obstacles provided by States as datasets to satisfy user requirements for many airborne and 
ground applications such as ground proximity warning systems, terrain alert and warning systems, and the 
Minimum Safe Altitude Warning provided by ATC. eTOD could also be used to satisfy the needs of UAM. 
According to SKYbrary [24], a terrain dataset such as eTOD is a digital representation of the elevation of 
the terrain at a number of discrete points. Major features of a terrain database include geometric 
distribution/position of discrete points, horizontal/vertical datum and specific units of measurement. In the 
context of eTOD, terrain is defined as, “The surface of the Earth containing naturally occurring features 
such as mountains, hills, ridges, valleys, bodies of water, permanent ice and snow, and excluding obstacles.”  
An obstacle database is a digital representation of the obstacles which includes the horizontal and 
vertical extent of man-made and natural significant features, whether fixed or mobile, temporary or 
permanent. Environmental Science Research Institute compiled a toolset for use by States in complying 
with ICAO rules requiring them to provide an electronic terrain and obstacle database. That toolset is being 
used by several companies to help States around the world meet their requirement to protect air operations 
near their airports. Extending this technique to cover entire metropolitan areas is both technically and 
financially feasible. It is just required that it be done in locations and for the purpose of protecting UAM 
flights. For those reasons, this item has an estimated TRL of 8, since it is already operationally used to 
protect aviation but must be extended to fulfill the specific needs of UAM. It is not a capability unique to 
the ABTM concept, but there is a dependence on its fulfillment for all UAM concepts. 
L. Resilient Performance in All Foreseeable Failure Modes 
UAM, provided by autonomous vehicles that will be operated by numerous private companies and 
individuals, contains a great many hazards that must be mitigated to provide the operational safety expected 
  
31 
by the public, and that will be necessary, both in the beginning and on a continuing basis, for UAM to be 
viable. Comparisons to the accident record of automobile traffic or general aviation flights are not valid 
because the public has become hardened to these somewhat frequent tragedies through familiarity. UAM 
introduces a completely new paradigm that the public must learn to trust over years of safe operations. One 
accident killing people on the ground during the introduction of these services would likely result in 
suspension of operations, perhaps permanently. Analogies include the Hindenburg disaster and the New 
York Helicopter Airways crash on top of the Pan Am building in New York. 
The failure hazards faced by UAM operations can be placed into two broad categories, those failures 
that occur on the vehicles themselves and those that occur in the external environment that impact the safety 
of UAM flights. Nearly all failures can be anticipated through methodical safety analysis and their 
mitigations planned for in the design of the vehicles and their support systems. The hazard mitigations must 
be extremely robust as the target level of safety for UAM will likely be an order of magnitude better than 
the existing record of piloted aviation. The requirement for greater safety is simply a matter of the far greater 
numbers of people and property underneath the bulk of these flights. 
The systems internal to the vehicles are mechanical, electrical and electronic (i.e., avionics). They are 
to be addressed through certification of the aircraft themselves. Mechanical systems include the fixed 
structure and all the moving parts – motors, rotors, propellers, tilting wings and moving control surfaces, 
buttons, batteries and wiring, seats, knobs and handles. In eVTOLs, the electrical system is the heart of the 
vehicle, responsible for everything to function, from propulsion, lift and flight control to powering all the 
avionics upon which the entire operation depends. Power distribution, modulation and conditioning must 
perform flawlessly in all operating environments. Battery temperature must remain stable during the 
maximum charge and discharge loads. Certification must account for all anticipated loads and failure modes 
of the components making up the total electrical system, including safe recovery of the vehicle in the event 
of total electrical shutdown. 
The electronics in a UAM vehicle include the navigation sensors (GNSS, radar and optical) and 
processors; surveillance systems (ADS-B, radar and optical) and the separation and collision avoidance 
processors they feed; communications systems to send and receive weather data and those that are a part of 
surveillance and operational control, are all critical to the successful operation of autonomous UAM 
vehicles. Failures in any of these avionics systems must be accounted for in certification so that none is 
catastrophic, singly or in combination. 
The external environment includes weather phenomena, the radio frequency and electromagnetic 
environment and the traffic and obstructions present within the navigable airspace. Hazardous weather is 
not a system failure, but the network to inform the vehicles of such conditions can fail in whole or in part. 
It is important for a UAV to know that the flight path ahead does not contain winds or turbulence beyond 
the performance capability or control authority available in the vehicle. Similarly, heavy precipitation or 
freezing rain or drizzle must be sensed, and its location conveyed to all traffic in the vicinity. Redundant 
and multiple communication networks must be available to receive the weather and surveillance 
information, so that single point failures do not bring an end to the flight. Inter-vehicle communications for 
collision avoidance and vertiport traffic management should also be redundant and use multiple 
frequencies. The same should apply to communication of geofencing applications to prevent conflicts at 
airports with piloted flights.  Such failures in the support infrastructure are not part of the vehicle 
certification but their failure to deliver can be just as hazardous to the UAM operations. It is important that 
RTCA be tasked to create a Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards (MASPS) for UAM support 
systems in order to meet this requirement. 
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It is apparent that there will still be numerous failures for which redundant systems or carefully designed 
and manufactured components cannot mitigate. As most eVTOL designs in development will not be able 
to glide or autorotate to a safe location in an urban environment, a “smart” ballistic parachute recovery 
system that can glide to a safe touchdown point will likely be required on most UAM aircraft. The 
requirements for such a system were submitted to the NASA Langley Technology Transfer Program, in an 
entry called, “Guided Gliding Parachute Drone Recovery” but it is estimated at TRL 2 and requires 
substantial R&D to bring it to a ready state for UAS industry adoption. The hardware will likely be available 
from industry, but the smart guidance should be a NASA development. This is required for all UAM, not 
just ABTM. 
Over the last two decades, NASA has sponsored many studies of aviation hazards and their possible 
mitigations. The research required to address the risks associated with UAM operations should take 
advantage of this trove of previous work to speed the process. In this context, the safety work is very closely 
tied to the AI developments that must take place to enable autonomous UAM flights. While currently 
estimated at TRL 3, NASA is ideally suited to lead this effort and speed its progress. 
Addendum Conclusion 
The list of foundational prerequisites to enable the ABTM for UAM concept to come to fruition have 
been identified by NASA researchers David Thipphavong and David Wing and by the author himself. This 
list has been reviewed and analyzed to show how each technology is used in the ABTM concept, and the 
TRL of each has been estimated based upon its reported state of development and use in the UAS and 
piloted aviation industry today. A summary table of these findings serves as a high-level guide for needed 
additional research. It is seen that most of the technologies are already mature enough to be used in an 
experimental if not operational mode, and that adaptation to the specifics of UAM operations is the primary 
task still to be accomplished. Three exceptions are fully autonomous operations, self-separation and 
collision avoidance, and failure mode self-mitigation. It is considered of highest importance for NASA to 
continue to lead in the pursuit of these technological advances, specifically applied to the needs of aviation, 
both manned and unmanned. For UAM it is a financial imperative and for piloted aviation it is a safety 
imperative. 
Finally, the bulk of this analysis has applied to sUAS, the low altitude, small UAS expected to be the 
first to operate regularly in urban areas. The larger eVTOL air taxis and even larger hybrid powered inter-
city UAS being invented will contain the same avionics and use much of the same infrastructure as today’s 
piloted aviation. The primary difference proposed in the ABTM for UAM concepts for these larger and 
higher altitude flights is the use of AFR for separation from conventional piloted traffic in mixed airspace. 
This concept is described in detail in [5] and would be supplemented in the terminal area with controller-
drone Data Comm for sequencing and spacing to regular airport runways (when used) and for takeoff and 
landing clearance and taxi instructions at those same locations. AFR is equally valuable to both piloted and 
unpiloted flights at all operating altitudes and should be pursued by NASA in both contexts as a fundamental 
improvement to the safety, capacity and flexibility of both UTM and ATM. 
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